University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and
Interviews

Mike Mansfield Papers

1954

Geneva and Indo-China
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "Geneva and Indo-China" (1954). Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and
Interviews. 92.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/92

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University
of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Narch 22 , 1954

FOR OOCDHTE R.E;,EASE
FROt·i THE OFFICE OF 3EJ-:ATOR MIKE ~..ANSFIF.LD (D ., Monte.:1s)

i
'I·ne
and

\13.'"

in Indochina is in its eighth yee:r ~

str.le~-.ad,

Fre ••c!l

c~::.r.not

is still with ti.e Viet Minh.

win a subztantial

v ictor~·

'Il~e

cffens5ve , thoagh harassed

Expert ob3en•ers tell us tha t the

L"1 less t!':a:&

t~.,ro

years , a!'ld u!'lless

so:nething happens to gelvanize their f:pirit an:! effo:::-t, fi!'lal military vlctcry may
~'anwhile 1

be impossible.

t~e

the politic2l cpposltion to

Go~e rrunent ! s

French

policy i."1 Pe:Lis is growi..i(; nore veher.ent and their demands for a ce".:>3-f lre have
rt3sul ted in the convening of the Gcr.eva Conference,
Truce as a precedent upon
Vietmin~~

wh~.oh

'I hey have

plu~kea

armistJ.~e

to base their ar·Vl!J'.ents t!1P.t an

is compatible with French hc!'lor .

wh:l.;::h preclt...des UN bterference oThile the war in Korea

hopes

t~e

wit!i tt.e

'l'h ' s , of course , ignores the fact that,

the French have consistently held that the ••ar in Indoch:i.na is a

aggressor inve.dine an independent state,

t'1e Kor ean

\o.'!l.S

11

civil

in~~.:rraction•

against a recognized

It is sa:.d that the French Government

Genuva Conference will be a cilencer of its opposition; that the

intransigence of the Con!lunists will ccn1ince their cour.tryn;en that thHre is no
possible settl')ment outside of milita:::-y victory .
happc!'l that the

fail~re

On the ot:113r

ha!'ld~

:.t may also

to bring res\:lts £rom Gensva nuy topJJle the Laniel regime ,

!'laci!'lg Mend.es-:'-ance and his group - •, ho would be pledg.Jd to ter:oir.ate the
hostilitiez C::'\' er to the e:xter.t of wHhdr awL11g Fre:1c:1 trco:'S - b a more r.:ommanding
position~

J..t

th~.s

r~prC;sentatives

date J it has not been deter:1ined whether

Associated States will partir'ipate in Geneva.

To mar.y

V..let.nt~:r.ese ,

la::-eer measure , represents a betrayal of their nationalint
1.:hat has France to give in "cive and take'' negotiations.
with Ho Chi Minh by offering a coalition or
those Vietnamese whose resistance has been
fatally tmdercut,

partia~

frora the

Ge!'leva, in its

nove~:ent,.

Thay ask :

Tl:3y e.:ts;.Jer : coJlpr oiJise

recognition -- a move whereby

ccnsis~ent

and eotermined would be

--2-Jir • Pres icien t , next tton th tho l ni ted S totcs

\li 11

China , ru.d other co:..n rics ir. n conference at Ge>:.eva.
ference

pres~ubly

is the c.:.tuation in Korea .

ever, that discus:>ion Yill focus
Tr.e Ge:1eva Ccnfer.:m-:e

s

o:i

t.~e

sit dovn vit.h C
The subject of tl e con-

There is every indication , hoY-

tl.e situation in lndc-Ghina .

re:ml t of tht> Be!'! in rrec'tinc n few vecks .. o

c.nd ropresents the price paid t.y us for French solidarity at tle Eerlin conferme to te a p::rti::l Soviet diplomatic victory since it \Jill ,

It see:ns b

ene;e .

gc facto_, Give a deg!"ce of recocnition to the Chir.ese Corr.ounist eove::-1· cnt .
Tbo Sc•:iet Uni0n has \-TOnted that ; \.re ht.4Ve r.o• .

::r . t:clotov u::td3 it clear at

Be::-lin that tr.e Soviet Union wanted tt:o th · ncs; U:e defeat of the

Defense Corcr:r.mi t:,r

~nd

:-ecocni tion fo:- Rs:l Chin:1.

Tl.e dec :.sion to I.eet with the Col1ll!un5.s ts in
tration

so lel~r

on its

l~c.der ,

G~neva

\.'OS made l y th9 adminis -

There \las no prior c0nsul taticn with

o~:n respons ibility ~

mo:nber s on tLi:J 3ido of the aisle .
BUished majo::-i ty

Eu:·o~eo.n

And ,:\:uc:ine; by tle reaction of t;e dist ' n-

lr . l'.no\Jlo.nd ,

confert:!nce , the othtJ' side of tl:e aisle

\It en he heor d the anno\•nce .ent of the
r11

s t r.ave "-"so teen kept i:1 the d 'lrk .

Be that as it may , the Uni ted S t~tes is now cor ~mit ted to a confcrenca 1,1ith
the Ccm:r.uni sts on the Fa r East .
mny not ha•1e beer! a wise one .

'·le C"!'mot
1:e have to

revl~:-se

m~ke

the

d~c1sion

the Lest of it .

even thoueh it
'!'he only Yay we

can do so i3 to tla'{e cer ta:!.n that the free nations enter t.he coni'e.-ence \lith their
stronccst

~cot

for war d .

SP.cretary Dulles faces , in Genevc. ,
TLe Confer e'lce there

n~y

nunity in the ncar future

ti~e

most d 'fficul t tssl-: of l:is career .

wall influence the outccwe of tr.e
~d

Europ~an

Defense Con:-

the nat·ro of events in Asia for decades to come .

':'he Secretary of State 1-:no\IS that ho will face da.ucerous pi tfall3 , tr.at his
job ·Jill be

extrel:lel~t

celicate ar.d th' t } e will r.3ad tho creates t understanding

- .3and the Greatest possible bl-partiea11 support to succeed.

I \tould not le honest

if I did not sc.y that, as an individttd Senator, I run sonel:r<J.t apprenl-,ensive
about Geneva.

I would not be

can and sho•ll.d

rais~

honc~t,

eJ.the:c, J.f I did not scy that while we

<;uestio:::ss offer suggest::.ons ar.d ei·Ie advice ,

al:.o give to our Secretc.ry of State as much encouracren.snt and

Ye

s~·pport

shoi..:ld
as is

possible.
It ha:J been

~wid

many tin:ea bt•t it bears repeatincr :

the only 'vtay to

negotiate st.ccessf.U::.ly with the Comm•mists is to ne'Yotiate fror:!. strenc
Hill tnis le the ca::>e at the coming conference in Ge!leva?

\1 .

IIc.s the adminis-

tr,tion exercised /.mcrican leaders rip 'vTisely to see that \:e will be na ~otiating
fro:n

stren~th?

Has it made certain that the free nations uiJ.l eo into the con-

ference in uniBon o.nd at full strcneth?
f'lch

countr~'

in its o•,m

wa~',

G~nava?

Or are ue drift.inrr to•11ards

uit11ot•t adequate preparation, without

11

'.Lhink -thro•tgh 11 ,

without a clear- ctt sense of destination?
As I
ference .

s~id

tefcre , it is too late to reverse tho decision to hold this con-

It is r.ot too late, ho\v::ver , to question the preparations for it.

And it is for this pt•rpcse that I \-tish to address myself briefly to the
L~do-China

situation .

I wrmt to make certain that uith respect to this aspect

of toe coming conference, +.he United States sees eye to
cou.'1trieJ .
vital

e~·e

with friendly

I \-Ta."lt to make certain that the free nations do not abandon the

peri~et~r

of Sot:.theast Asia for a false peace of appeasament at

~:,eva .

--4-t~

Let r.;e r.;ake clear
thin

O!'

ar.y other proulet .

t. I e.r.: not opposed to a pcc.ce.ful scttle=t.ent of

If the conflict ir. I. de-China cru1 be brou..,ht to

a clo:.e wit ..out

surrendcri~

I n. 'lll

:.uch a. sottler:ont .

~relccn;e

t!

area cooner or later to totalitarian co:nr:iUnisn,
An~

one in tr.eir r.:.ght cind vould favor

puttir.b ar. e:;d to l>loodsl.eds i f it can oe aone H.:..tb:mt nppc!lseme! t of totc..li~rithot!t los~

te.ria.nisr::,

of freedo:--, Hithout , ir. the lent; run jeoparrlizinG tl o

safetj of tui::; count.ry a:;d other free natior,., .
To achieve :mel. a. settlerr.c11t on Indo-Chin%3. at the conflJrence b.ble,
huuever , requires the rr..arsLallin0 of the full potential of the

fr~e

cotmtrie: .

It requires us, furt ..er, to :.,e prepared to carry on the strugt5le to a

s:.:.~cess 

ful concluzion in tl.e event the Gor::.runists turn cio:m a just and t.onorabls
settler ,or. t .
A::; tl1e

~enute kllO\!S 1

s ltu.ation for sot e tirre .
defen~e

I rave been deepl; interc3ted in the Indo-Chinese

I believe t!mt it is one of t!:e ke.f areas in tl1e

of freedom in t:.e Horld .

I belie•1e tLe decision as to \.tl.etl"er or not

ue wEl bave, one do.y, to uefend our o•m sl.orcs r;,ay very \lell be rr.ado on those
distant shoru:> .

L~e!ri.r.d

I •.:ot.J.d

until after Indo-Chir..a

\·IllS

tte St:nate tbat Pe.:u-1

l.arl>o~· HilS

not attacked

firmlJ' in enc!T'y lJUiids .

Last iull I visited t.l:e three Associated Indo-Cl'inese states of L<:tos ,
Cambodia, and Viet ! ""'m .

J1.t t-!.a t..

til.e, I crossed pa.tr:s in Inaia with tl.e dis--

tb.:,-uid~ed ~jority

leader \.lho I know is fully co._;nizar.t of the i. portance of

Ir.dc--China .

11eeks

A few

a~o

the distin"'u:.shed

ma~crity

lc"'-dcr a.n::i I er.tercd

ir.to a colloqt!J on t:te floor of the Senate on this very subject. .

lt

H<:.S

at tre

time that tl.e Administration c.Jmounced toot $erican aviation iecL.r-.icians Here
beint seni:. to Indo-CM:
abree:~~.. i. .

should

~ake

!! .

If I am not m:ste.ke •• , we found ourselves in substantial

If r;;,r recollecticn is correct, ve felt that ''!cile the United

~tates

c. co.1t~'i'Lution to the C.efcnse of In<..c- Ci.ina, .,,e should not co::rit

An.erican forces to the fi . . . hting the!'e .

- 5I think that the distinguished majority leader would agree that three factors
are essential i f Indo- Ch;na is to be kept free of totalitarian

do~ination

whether

by victory over the Communist- led forces of Ho Chi tlinh or by negotiation.

First ,

the French who are making profound sacrifices in Indo-China must continue for a
while loneer their great military effort in defense of the three Indo--Chinese states.
And they must also continue their political effort to bring genuine
indepe~dence

to these states.

Second , the Indo-Chinese nationalist leaders must be

able to rally their people to fight for their independence against
domination.

na~ional

co~~unist

Third, military aid must be continued by the United States but ·

American forces must not become involved in the confljcto
This three- pronged approach remain3 the key to a satisfactory solution of the
Indo- China problem.
in Geneva are to be

It is necessary if the negotiations which are about to open
s~ccessful.

It is imperative if those negotiations fail.

Un-

less it is follm.,red , we may very well have to examine the whole premise of our
policy with respect to Indo-China$
Is the Administration following this three- pronged approach?

Certainly, the

administration is interested in it . But what is being done to further it?

Is the

necessary Americo.n leadership being brought to bear? Or is the Administration just
drifting?
\!e

Drifting in Indo-China and drifting towards appeasement at Geneva?
continue to receive optimistic reports from the Adltinistration about

eventual victory in Indo- Chinao

I regret to say that reports from practically every

other source indicate a stalemate of indefinite duration in Indo- China.
From Paris comes word that the French want to quit the
any price.
themselves$

struggl~,

almost at

I certainly sympathize with the situation in which the French find
They have mado great sacrifices to prevent the Communists from

strangling the independence of the three I:lC.o- Chinese states at birth.

'!'hey are

weary after eight long years of war.

~ompromises

The drain of Indo- China seriouslv

---c--tho role wr.ich the French

~

.ould be playlne in Europe .

l everthelcos, tho

continued effort of tr.e Fre:1ch in Iz.do--Cn:\.n.:J. is esoential if tl.is area in
to fall to the Comz::uni:::ts .

everythi~

ot

Eas tl o Aclluinis tra tion r..ade clear to Fra':lce the

vital iL.portanco of her rr:isoion to Indc- China to !.'!'ecdom?
tion done

1

has the Acii.ur.i ::rtra-

poscible to encourage tl.e French to ccnti1ue?

I believe

it Las .
P.e!)ort:; from Indo--C!--.ina indicate th.::t the local n!ltionalist
particularly in Viet

l.a~r ,

le~:dero,

are not provinG very succe::;sful iu rallying tl.eir

people to defend t:1e indupe:1denco of tr.c throe states .
that l.o Chi i·j_nh effectively co:-.cecls his

ccrr.ll:uni~r

1 hose

report::; ir:dico.te

.;,.n tl e clouk cf nationalism

and re7ains tbe SJl..bol c:!: .::..nti- coloni.::..l patr.:..otism to

I:Jal

y inhabitants o!.' Viet.

i.ar. •
\!Ly is tLis U e case?

Are tl.e nationulist lender::J too complacent?

Are they r.ot sufficiently representative of their reople or responsive to their
needs?

.ihen I retur:.ed frow Iu::o--... r.d.na l<...st fall I reported on this matter to

tr.e Sonate Fore.:.un Rel£..tions Cour.ittee in tl.e follouing terr s :
The basic problem uhich confronts all three

uovernmC;m,.J and parvicularly that of Vietnam
is to put do\m firm roots in tl:.eir r€spective
populati ons .
I said f'..lrther tf.;B.t t!.e:;:e governrr.ents IT.ust deo.l \oJith the bcsic social
a:1d econ0rr..ic proolt.)roS of tteir coi.illtries , tr.at tl.ey r:ust develop armed force:>
aevoted to tLc national ir.terest a ..d that
I wo.rr.ca ,

tl:.:J. t

t~.ey

m.:.st co;nba.t corruption.

- 7 failure in these basic respoPsibilities of self- government
will result jn ~he achie7em~nt of the shadow r~ther than
the su~stance of indepenCence .
And that
It could elso mean the rapid reduction o~ the three nations
to chaos and the subsequent int7Usion of so~e new form of
foreign domination from close at hand .
L~

discussirg the internal situation in Indo- Ghina I co not

ir. persor:nlities .

~jsh

to indulge

I have met many of the lead.ing figt:res in the governcents

there end it would be inappropTiate for me to measure one against the other .

I do

not think it i:w.ppropriate , however , for the Adr:lini::;tration \lhich !13.s COII',.!;litted
this country to the tune of o<er a billion dollars a year in Indo-China to look
deeply into the inte1·nnl situation thereo

Has the

Ad!nL~istration

sought to fjnd

out why popular support has not gathered mo!'e effectively behind the Viet Nar.ese
government?

What

doe~

the

Admjnist~&tion

propose to do about it?

So~ethi~g

needs to be done if "the r0sistance of the Indo- Chinese people to ccmr.1unisrn is to
be keyed to the requ.!.rer:J.ents of the situation.

0cmething needs to

local &rmies are to be trained as effective instruments of

b~

cone

if

freedo~~

Has consic'.erat.:on been given to the possibility, by France , of issuing
additio~al

public assurances to the Indo- Chinese stetes of full independence

within or without the French Union as a means of rellying support to the Hat i onalisi
governoents?
Hes coD::;ideration been given to the eppointment , by the
th~ee

Ur.~ted

sepacate AEbassadors to the three Associated States as n

f~dcnce

States , of

~a7k c~ oUT co~-

in their future?

Has con::;ideration been given to the use of United States technical per sonnel
battalion coMpany , - platoon commanders
to spP.ed up the
French

train~.ng

TraL~inc Co~nd

to \fork under the

of local troops in Ir.do- China?
has teen

establi~hed

ar.d that

t~o

I

Frenc~

u~de:tstand

high command,
that a new

United States officer s

- 8 have been

assig~ed

to that Command .

ing their attit'Jde in th.it> re:::p€ct .
for~es

~tates.

from the Un)ted

Sta~en

skilled United
not huve a

indi~ates

that the

F~ench

reight be chang-

I am uot cE.ll.:.ng for thl3 despatch of frozh

But ttis countr7 already has more than 750 trnjning

technicians on the Island of Formosa.
alist armies for yearso

This

They r.ave been trni."1ing the Chineze i.at1on-

Isn;t is possible thct at

le~st

p~t

a

of this highly-

contingent might be reassigned to Indo- Chins?

more immediate utility in the latter area?

:-lculd th'Jy

Thd Communists ccu:.u

hardly take retaliator/ measures against tnis type of assistance 'by tho U:•.i.ted
$t&ter ina::.much

as Red China already has more than 6,000

':lith this kind of assistance , the Viotnc.me::;e \Jill feel, I

indegenous army c£J.n he trd ned

j

11

ndvifers 1'

a."U

i~

l:ldo-China.

sure 1 tr.at an

n two or three years , at r..os t .

It is clear to most observers \il;r.t would happen ";ere the Fron(;h to

sce:ne i..nrnlsdiately ~

~.eu•;e

the

A vacuc=J. would remil. t t·.hich the Ccmounis•.-.3 i:ould fill o'. er:lig:!t~

Tee above p1·oposal would requ:i re the French to remain b milj ':..e.;-y strength for two 1
perhaps

th~ee ,

ye&rs ur.til trajned Vietnamese could reple.ce their troops.

to such en American
fighting a war ,
Frencho

~ven

po3it~on ,

In reply

Fs.ris might "'ell ask "'hy Frencr. troops should continue

for two years , if there is no

pro~ise

of eventual gain to the

In reply to this , four points can be ma::1e :

(l) The United States is most anxious to implement the French desire
to stop the drain both on St. Cyr - the Frent;h Hest Pc_.t - and its
traasu!'y .
(2) A defi:1ite prv.:>osal to withdraw Frencf. fo!'ces from In~o<:hjna with:n
o. stecifJ.ed time - already sugges'.;ed by tl:e dis "vi:- C'lishr,;d. m.?.jurity
lec.der - \IOu:i.d tend to stabilne Frar.~e 's p~l.:tic.-=.1 sJ.tu&~io!"l a~.d
help ~estore its position in Europe.
(3) couch a proposal would give meaning to the Frcnc!"l d<2cl.xations eb:mt
their intent'..ons ~_:1 reeard to -lfietne!:lese ind9~)er.denceo \L.th thnt
kind of es::>t:rance, bo7-h po.r"vies coul:l ,.;ork !:lore ~-: el? in defining
the ~:ench Union and there is good. reason to believe t he t Viett.am
woulc~ oe greatly encourt.gcd to continue itJ voluTto.~y ~:;;;~cciat.:on
with France withi~ the Unicn .

..,

( I \

I·ran~e has an historical obligetion toward the Assoc.:i.ctPd States •
M "..t.~ many decades ( f colo:~ial rule , Fr!lnce could be expected · .o
contim1e its military commitment for t..:o or three j ~a:·s so as to
assure Vietndl:l 1 s s~~cessful transition fro::. a cclory to en

independent

s~ate,

--9-One of the keys to the problem of Indo-China i!. rc.any ways is the
obscurer.css of tr.e Frencn

po~i t.:.or: .

J. he concept of the l'rench

so ruddied treat it can ncit!-1er be boUaLt nor sold .

U1.~cn

is s ~.ill

Vietmm, Laos and

C~bodia

recosnize the vulues of a continued associat!l)n with France but natural}.y •:ant
to forge that bor.d as independent r.ations .

This proposal might help cl<Jrify

the political, as uell as the l'lilitary positior. of France .
}Jelp to disavow the growing

feelin~

It \.JOuld certainly

amcng the Vietnamese a•1d other Asia1.s that

tr.e United States is prind.pn.ll; interested in supporting .?'ranee, •1hatcver the
cost, instead of assisting ti.e Ir:do-Cl.5.neee peoples ln finding freedom.
I do not knou v/hether positive rr.easures f."UCh
are prt:.ctical.

6.!3

I h:l.ve been discussing

J.'he .hdminist.ration has not tcJ{en tLe Ser.atc into its confidence

ar.d only tLe Adz:i.nistration l.as the facts on which to base ac !:.ion.
l.o>Jevcr, that

wD.e~s col:l~t:Cin.;

is do.1e, tl.c free

nation~

I do ::mow,

"-'lill dr·if ':. into 1-:.e

Geneva Conference alrc:...dy defeated on tr.e Indo-Cbina qt;.estion.

I do knO\I tr.at

unless t!.cre is unity of purpose ar.d a \-lillir,gn:;ss on t11e pa.r·t of all concerned
to make sc.crifices c..nd to rise to tl.e re:1lities of the s5.tus.tion, the
settle:T.ent

or~y

which \:ill be reacLed will be a settleJLent of appeasertent .

And if no settlement on Indo- China is achieved at. Geneva, what then?
Is the free world

co~ldemr.ed

to continue indefinitely this \-lasting struggle

in the junt)le-:; and r·ice paddies?
of their rril.i.tary
ist sentirrent

f'..c.r~hood

•.o~hicl'~

in the

l.:e the French to continue to lose the cream
s>o~amps

of 1:-:do-Ci:lina?

stirs the fine people of the throe Associated Stc-.tes con-

dE:mned to bitter ancl endless frustration?
curselves to en ov.::.:v

o::

~ "'"'~

Are ;te in this co'.liltry to resi.;n

a billion dollurs or n:orc over.l year over the

indefin.:.tP futt•re to ct.ppcrt. th::.s

riu"

Is the g:'!nuine national-

nevcr- er.di!l~

"'-:>t be the result, .

..-ar ir. Inclo-Chir:e.?

':'Lere is ztill tir.c to end the drift .

--lC...-

ThEre is still tit10 , even before tho Gcr,e-:a Conference
!'<Jrces of f.rceco:J to meet the situation in IY:do-Chino. .
to

as::>~rt

n positiv3, purposef'..ll leadership .

is ru.."llling

.

~r ort .

open~,

to rally tl...e

'Here iz still limo

There is still time, but it

ilill we rr.ake use of it before i t is too lt:.to '!

